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Abstract
We present a formulation of naturalness made in the framework of Bayesian
statistics, which unravels the conceptual problems related to previous approaches.
Among other things, the relative interpretation of the measure of naturalness turns
out to be unambiguously established by Jeffreys’ scale. Also, the usual sensitivity
formulation (so-called Barbieri-Giudice measure) appears to be embedded in our
formulation under an extended form. We derive the general sensitivity formula
applicable to an arbitrary number of observables. Several consequences and de-
velopments are further discussed. As a final illustration, we work out the map of
combined fine-tuning associated to the gauge hierarchy problem and neutralino dark
matter in a classic supersymmetric model.
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1 Introduction
The notions of naturalness and fine-tuning are a center of interest in some domains of
theoretical physics, like the theoretical side of particle physics and cosmology. Loosely
speaking, these notions refer to the propensity of a model to reproduce the experimental
observations. When they are employed, their effect is to modify our degree of belief
in the model examined. Indeed, intuitively, our degree of belief in a model follows its
propensity to fullfil experimental constraints. For instance, when the parameters of
a model should be adjusted very precisely to satisfy a constraint, the model is said to
suffer from a lack of naturalness, or to have a fine-tuning problem, and this consideration
typically decreases our degree of belief in the model.
But these considerations, even if they are taken to be intuitive by a certain fraction
of people, remain fully subjective and unquantified. To be more precise and eventually
extract some objective information from these intuitive observations, two things are
necessary. First, it is necessary to define a consistent measure of naturalness. Second,
it is also necessary to have a rule telling how the measure of naturalness should be
mapped to our degree of belief. This second point is important, because the measure of
naturalness would not be usable if the subjectivity was not under control.
Several naturalness issues appear in particle physics, with in particular the gauge
hierarchy problem, the strong CP puzzle, the flavour puzzle, as well as in cosmology, with
the cosmological constant problem, cosmological coincidence, and the flatness problem.
The later being resolved by the inflationary theory. We refer to App.A for a short
reminder on those different issues.
To our knowledge, it is in the context of the gauge hierarchy problem that a mea-
sure of naturalness–i.e. of fine-tuning–was first built. Indeed, supersymmetric (SUSY)
models solve the gauge hierarchy problem up to a certain degree, leaving a so-called
little hierarchy problem1. In the seminal papers [1] and [2], the amount of fine-tuning is
defined as the sensitivity of the electroweak scale (characterized by the Z boson mass)
with respect to the model parameters. An ad-hoc formula quantifying the fine-tuning is
then derived,
maxi
∣∣∣∣∂ logm2Z∂ log θi
∣∣∣∣ . (1)
In this context, the formula gives a measure of the amount of cancellation between the
SUSY parameters, which are typically O(TeV), necessary to reproduce the Z boson mass,
one order of magnitude below.
This sensitivity measure (often called Barbieri-Giudice measure) is largely exploited
in the SUSY literature. We refer for example to [3–6] for recent work making use of it.
However this formulation has also been criticized, either for its limitations, or at the con-
ceptual level. At the conceptual level, maybe the most straightforward remark is there
is no rule connecting the sensitivity measure to our degree of belief. The interpretation
of the numbers provided by Eq. (1) is therefore fully subjective.
Several attempts in the literature have been already made to produce alternative
definitions, with in particular the papers [7] and [8]. Among other things, the work
[7] introduces the key notion of probability distribution of parameters, while [8] also
introduces the important notion of volume of parameter space. Other propositions have
also been discussed in [9–12]. However, even though all of these alternative propositions
1The little hierarchy problem comes from the tension remaining between electroweak and TeV scales,
and is in fact an issue common to a lot of (all?) models of physics beyond the Standard Model.
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are well motivated and contain interesting ingredients, it is unfortunately still possible to
find conceptual problems and criticisms. Overall, one may find that all those measures
of fine-tuning are a bit ad-hoc or lack for a robust framework.
It is with the will of offering a solid framework to the notion of naturalness that we
present an approach based on Bayesian statistics. Among other things, the link between
the naturalness measure and the degree of belief will be established from Jeffreys’ scale.
Also, our approach turns out to contain the sensitivity measure in a generalized form.
Once embedded in this framework, the usual limitations and problems of the sensitiv-
ity measure vanish. An attempt in that direction has been done in [5]. It is, to our
knowledge, the only paper containing this idea.
The article is organized as follows. Naturalness problems, the sensitivity formula-
tion and its conceptual flaws are reviewed in a generic way in Section 2. Section 3 is
devoted to basics of Bayesian model comparison relevant for our purpose, such that our
presentation is self-contained from the point of view of Bayesian statistics. We then ex-
pose the Bayesian approach to naturalness and its implications in Section 4. Section 5 is
finally devoted to some application of the results, focusing mainly on the gauge hierarchy
problem in supersymmetric models.
2 Fine-tuning, puzzles and sensitivity
In this section, we discuss in a generic way naturalness problems and the sensitivity
formulation. The presentation is aimingly transverse, and applicable to any naturalness
problem. Along these lines, some of the statements might appear weak or lacking of
solid definitions. These inconsistencies will be highlighted in the last paragraph. The
critical point of view will be adopted only in this last part. The rest of the section is
supporting the sensitivity formulation.
Along the section, we will consider a dimensionless quantity δ defined in a given
model M, with parameters θi. We will assume that this δ is subject to experimental
constraints (or any other piece of information exterior to the model). In all generality,
one can say that a naturalness problem appears when δ is constrained to values that
it is not expected to take. In particular, it can be different from O(1) while it was
expected to be O(1), or at the opposite it can be of O(1) while it was not expected to be
O(1). For instance, the gauge hierarchy, cosmological constant and strong CP problems
enter in that first category, with δ being m2Z/M
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Pl, ρΛ/M
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Pl and θ/2pi, respectively. The
universe flatness problem and cosmological coincidence enter in the second category,
with δ being ρ/ρc and ρΛ/ρM , respectively. However, this splitting into two categories
is in fact artificial. Indeed, one has always the freedom to transform one in the other by
redefining δ → 1/(δ − 1). Therefore, in this section, whatever the naturalness problem
is, we will always choose to define δ as a number unnaturally smaller than one.
In all generality, δ is a function of the model parameters, δ(θi). As we are concerned
with the values that δ can potentially take, the dependence with respect to the param-
eters is crucial. In the limiting case where δ does not depend at all on the parameters,
it is completely determined by the model M. In that case, M is totally predictive, or
in other words, totally natural. In the opposite direction, the more δ depends on the
θi, the more one has to adjust precisely these parameters to satisfy the experimental
constraint, or, in other words, the more M is fine-tuned.
It is then temptating to define a measure of naturalness by making use of the deriva-
3
tive of δ with respect to the parameters. An appropriate quantity has to involve the
logarithm of δ to measure a relative variation, and the logarithm of θi to keep the inde-
pendence with respect to the choice of units, provided that θi is dimensionful. Therefore
this measure has to be based on the quantity |∂ log δ/∂ log θi|. Two such measures have
been provided (see [1, 2, 9, 13]), in the context of the gauge hierarchy problem and its
supersymmetric solution:
ca = maxi
∣∣∣∣ ∂ log δ∂ log θi
∣∣∣∣ or cb =
√√√√∑
i
(
∂ log δ
∂ log θi
)2
. (2)
Whatever the exact definition is, we will denote this kind of quantity as c. With this
definition, a fully predictive model has c = 0, and a model requiring infinite fine-tuning
has c→∞.
However, in between these two extreme cases, one can also identify a particular
threshold, when c = 1. This is the particular case where δ is directly an input parameter
of M. The strong CP puzzle and the flavour puzzle in the Standard Model, as well as
flatness of the universe and cosmic coincidence in the Standard Cosmological Model are
all examples of such a case. Depending on the context and on the opinions, this situation
is sometimes considered as being a “puzzle”, and not a “problem”. However, this kind
of consideration is subjective. It depends ultimately on whether the scientist wishes to
find a model more natural than the one with c = 1, or if he is satisfied with that one.
In any case, from the strict point of view of sensitivity, c = 1 appears well as a limit
between predictivity and fine-tuning.
Let us propose two toy examples to illustrate the c measure. To explain the smallness
of δ, one often has to invoke “special cancellations” between the θi. It is for example
the case in the gauge hierarchy problem, where cancellations between O(M2Pl) quantum
contributions needs to occur to obtain m2Z , or the cosmological constant problem, in
which cancellations between O(M4Pl) quantum contributions have to occur to make Λ
vanish. Let us sketch this by δ ∝ 1 − θ, where θ is a parameter expected to be O(1).
To produce δ  1, θ has to be tuned to be close to one. The c measure is then
|∂ log δ/∂ log θ| = θ/δ. c is proportional to θ, which is O(1), and to 1/δ which grows
with the precision of cancellation required. This quantity is thus well measuring the
amount of cancellation necessary to get δ  1.
The second toy example is the situation where δ ∝ e−θ, with θ still an O(1) pa-
rameter. This case of “exponential suppression” appears for example in the Randall-
Sundrum setup to solve the gauge hierarchy problem, in inflationary theories to explain
why ρ/ρc − 1 is so small, and also in the dimensional transmutation arising when an
asymptotically free theory becomes confining in the infrared. In that case, the c mea-
sure |∂ log δ/∂ log θ| = θ. It does not depend on δ but only on the order one parameter.
Comparing c = θ/δ and c = θ, one can see that the “exponential” model is more natural
by a factor δ with respect to the “cancellation” model.
This way of formulating a measure of naturalness using sensitivity seems well jus-
tified, even if rather ad-hoc. However, taking a closer look, one can identify several
conceptual flaws, more or less linked together, some of them being already obvious in
what we write above.
Firstly, the notion of “expectation” for the value of a quantity, that is used along
the section, is not rigourously defined. Even if one tries to express things differently, at
some point this notion appears and requires a precise definition. Secondly, the notion
of parameter space does not appear in this formulation. It is a bit worrying, as we are
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concerned with all potential values that δ could take. These two remarks are particularly
suggestive of the Bayesian approach which will be presented in the following sections.
But the third, worse issue is the following: there is no rule telling us how to interpret the
sensitivity measure in terms of a degree of belief. This holds for the absolute interpre-
tation of c, and also at the level of the relative interpretation, when one compares two
different values of c. For example, we said above that c in the exponential toy model is
enhanced by a factor δ with respect to the cancellation model. But does it really mean
that our relative degree of belief between the two models should be given by the value
δ? Or maybe δ2, or
√
δ? Finally, we can notice the freedom of redefinition of δ. For
instance, if one redefines δ → δ100, c is scaled by a factor 100. Given the absence of rule
to interpret c, this fact does not constitute a problem in itself. Instead, it can be taken
as a constraint of consistency. That is, it would be good that the interpretation of c
varies consistently with a redefinition of δ, so that the conclusions remain unchanged.
3 Bayesian model comparison
The aspects of Bayesian statistics relevant for our purpose are briefly reviewed in this
section. For any additional details, we refer the reader to the comprehensive review [14]
and references therein, and the textbook [15].
Within the framework of Bayesian statistics, the notion of probability is defined as a
measure of the degree of belief about a proposition. On the other hand, one also knows
that whatever the definition of probability p is, the axioms of probability theory entail
Bayes’ law:
p(A|B) = p(B|A)p(A)
p(B)
, (3)
which, with any additional true information I, takes the form
p(A|B, I) = p(B|A, I)p(A|I)
p(B|I) . (4)
This well known result gets a crucial meaning when applied to probability as a degree
of belief. Indeed, replacing A by any hypothesis H, and B by the known information
available (called d for “data”), the previous equality becomes
p(H|d, I) = p(d|H, I)p(H|I)
p(d|I) . (5)
In Eq. (5), p(H|I) is the probability (i.e. the degree of belief) given to the hypothesis
without taking the data into account, which is called prior probability, or just “prior”.
p(H|d, I) is the probability of the hypothesis once the data is taken into account, called
posterior probability. One thus sees that the Bayes formula, applied to a piece of infor-
mation d and a hypothesis H, tells how our degree of belief in H should be updated in
the light of d. This is the remaining term p(d|H, I)/p(d|I) which performs this action.
p(d|H, I) is the probability of obtaining the data assuming that the hypothesis is true.
But taken as a function of H, this quantity is not a probability anymore, and is called
a likelihood function, denoted as L(H). It has to be normalized by the constant p(d|I),
which is called Bayesian evidence. The Bayesian evidence is the sum over all possible
realizations of H:
p(d|I) =
∑
H
p(d|H, I)p(H|I) . (6)
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|logB01| Odds Probability Strength of evidence
< 1.0 . 3 : 1 < 0.750 Inconclusive
1.0 ∼ 3 : 1 0.750 Weak evidence
2.5 ∼ 12 : 1 0.923 Moderate evidence
5.0 ∼ 150 : 1 0.993 Strong evidence
Table 1: The empirical Jeffreys scale calibrating the odds between model M0 and model M1.
Two main applications follow from Eq. (5): parameter inference and model com-
parison. We will be interested in the latter for our purpose. For model comparison, it is
the Bayesian evidence Eq. (6) which will play the main role.
Let us consider Eq. (5), where hypothesis H is “model M is true” and there is no
additional proposition I. The equation becomes
p(M|d) = p(d|M)p(M)
p(d)
. (7)
Applying it to two models (which can be the same model with two different priors),M0
and M1, and eliminating the unknown constant p(d), one obtains the equation
p(M0|d)
p(M1|d) =
p(d|M0)
p(d|M1)
p(M0)
p(M1) . (8)
The quantity p(M0)p(M1) is called prior odds, while
p(M0|d)
p(M1|d) is called posterior odds. The
crucial quantity is the ratio of the Bayesian evidences p(d|M0)p(d|M1) , denoted as B01, and
called Bayes factor.
The Bayes factor tells us how the relative degree of belief between two models is
updated given information d. A Bayes factor larger [smaller] than 1 will favor M0
[M1]. Bayes factors are usually interpreted with respect to Jeffreys’ scale [16], given in
Table 3. This scale is empirically calibrated, with thresholds at values of the odds of
3 : 1, 12 : 1 and 150 : 1, representing weak, moderate and strong evidence in favour of
M0, respectively. It can also be convenient to consider the logarithm logB01.
Note that for a model with continuous parameters, the Bayesian evidence Eq. (6)
takes an integral form
p(d|I) =
∫
D
p(d|θ,M)p(θ|M) . (9)
It is then the average of the likelihood function over the parameter space D, weighted
by the prior density of the parameters within the model p(θ|M).
Bayesian model comparison tells us how the odds between two models should be
modified by taking into account an external piece of information d. It formalizes two
competing effects: quality of fit and predictivity. The first one is the usual measure of
deviation between data and prediction, given by the likelihood function. The second one
is a principle of economy, i.e. a formalization of Occam’s razor. It will enter in the form
of notion of volume in the parameter space. Roughly speaking, provided that the volume
of parameter space allowed by the likelihood is smaller than the one allowed by priors
(i.e. that data is informative), the Bayes factor will favor the model with the smaller
prior volume. Or in other words, it favors the model which is the more predictive with
respect to data. This notion of volume is closely related to Fisher information, which,
in this context, is a measure of the intrinsic amount of information that the likelihood
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function and priors contain [17]. For our purposes, we will consider the “observed”
Fisher information, defined as I{f}(x) =
∣∣∣−∂2 log f∂xixj ∣∣∣. For example, Fisher information of
a normal density with variance σ2 is 1/σ2, and Fisher information of a uniform density
over the volume V is 1/V 2. In the present work, it will mainly be this second aspect of
predictivity that will matter.
To end this section, let us discuss about the prior density p(θ|M). The choices
of both the functional form and the range of the prior density are critical. The range,
conservatively, should be taken as wide as possible. It can be crucial to have ranges which
are intrinsically bounded, such that prior volumes remain finite. On the other hand, the
functional form of the density is often chosen to be the less informative as possible, i.e.
the more objective. Several approaches, based on Fisher information (Jeffreys prior) or
the Kullback-Leibler divergence (reference priors, see e.g. [18]) have been elaborated to
construct such priors.
In this work, we will make use of the principle of indifference, which is an approach
to minimize the amount of subjective information about a problem. This principle states
that our a priori degree of belief about a problem should be invariant under transforma-
tions considered as irrelevant for the problem [19, 20]. Applied to continuous variables,
this condition constrains the objective densities and can sometimes fully determine them.
For example, a change in coordinates x′ = x+ a should not influence our a prior degree
of belief on x. This transformation is thus considered as irrelevant. This imposes the
condition p(x+a) = p(x), which constrains p to be the uniform density. Another impor-
tant example is the one of a dimensionful quantity, µ. The principle of indifference states
that our a priori degree of belief p(µ) should not depend on the choice of units, such
that µ′ = aµ has the same prior as µ. This translates as the condition p(µ) = ap(aµ),
which sets p(µ) ∝ µ−1, called logarithmic prior since µ−1dµ = d logµ. As a lot of our
observables and parameters are dimensionful, this logarithmic prior will be omnipresent.
4 Naturalness in a Bayesian framework
We present in this section the Bayesian approach to the notion of naturalness. First, let
us set up the notations. We consider a modelM, with a set of dimensionful parameters
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn), spanning the parameter space D of dimension n. We consider a set of
m dimensionful observables O(θ) = (O1, . . . ,Om) (with m ≤ n) predicted by this model,
taking measured value Oex on the subset of the parameter space Dex of dimension n−m.
Data other than the O measurement are collectively called d, and the likelihood function
p(O = Oex|θ,M) is denoted as LO(θ). An amount of precision Σ is associated to the
measurement of O. It can be for instance the covariance matrix of a multivariate normal
law, or it is more generally given by the Fisher information of the likelihood LO (as a
function of O), I{LO}(O) = Σ−1.
Calling O as an “observable” is somewhat misleading. In fact, it just has to be a
quantity constrained by experimental data (or any other exterior piece of information).
Note that compared to the δ defined in Section 2, we let the O be dimensionful. We
emphasize that we restrict ourselves to dimensionful observables and parameters for the
sake of simplicity. The consequence of this choice is to make appear logarithmic priors
everywhere. However, the whole approach is general to any prior. The generalization
does not present difficulty, and will be explained in the last subsection. Finally, the
reason of the restriction m ≤ n is that m > n is similar to m = n from the naturalness
point of view. This point will be discussed afterwards, in the last subsection.
7
4.1 Probability formulation
Loosely speaking, naturalness is the propensity of a given model to reproduce the ex-
perimental observation. Using the notations we adopted, the usual translation of this
idea is
• “Sensitivity of O with respect to θ, in the vicinity of a point θex belonging to Dex.”
This leads to the c measure already presented above,
ca = maxi
∣∣∣∣∂ logO∂ log θi
∣∣∣∣
θ=θex
(10)
or
cb =
√√√√∑
i
(
∂ logO
∂ log θi
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θex
. (11)
However, an alternative formulation for naturalness, arguably as intuitive as the first
one, is
• “Probability of having O = Oex in the model.”
This is this second formulation which will be our starting point. As it involves a notion
of probability, it necessarily has a Bayesian character. This formulation is translated as
the probability
p(O = Oex|M, d). (12)
But we are interested in this quantity as a function of the hypothesis (M, d). Taken
as such, it is not a probability, but instead a Bayesian evidence, as defined in Eq. (6).
Due to the absence of normalization, this evidence alone is not usable. Instead, it has to
appear inside a Bayes factor. As a measure of naturalness, we therefore have to consider
a Bayes factor which compares our hypothesis (M, d) to another hypothesis (M′, d′),
B =
p(O = Oex|M, d)
p(O = Oex|M′, d′) . (13)
This well-defined quantity plays the main role in our approach.
Two comments are in order. First, it is clear that such a measure of naturalness has
a relative character. In this framework, comparing the naturalness of two models M
andM′ is certainly possible, but an absolute statement about the naturalness ofM has
to be done with care. To do so, M′ would have to be defined such that it constitutes
an absolute reference. How this can be realized will be discuss further in the section.
Second, we emphasize that the distinction between the model M and the data d is
artificial. Indeed, d could be as well considered as a part of M. It just depends on how
M is defined. It is convenient to keep this separation explicit for the discussion, and to
stress that d and d′ need not be identical.
Let us now specify what are the different options available for (M′, d′). If one takes
the two pieces of data to be identical d = d′, and apply B to two realistic models
M and M′, it provides a measure of the relative naturalness between these models.
In particular, it makes sense to apply B to the same model with two different prior
densities. For instance, one can compare the naturalness of two different regions of the
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parameter space Dex. One can even choose punctual priors, that is priors that select a
single point belonging to Dex. In that case, B measures the relative naturalness between
two points of Dex. This brings us back to a local measure of naturalness, just like the c
measure. Note that the selection of a single point of the parameter space also happens
if pieces of data d(
′) are sufficiently constraining. A necessary condition for that is to
have at least as many observables in d(
′) as parameters in M(′).
Now, let the two models be identical, M = M′, and let the pieces of data be
different, d 6= d′. B indicates this time what is the change in naturalness induced by
going from data d to data d′. Following the literature, this kind of quantity may be
dubbed as “naturalness price” or “fine-tuning price” associated to the change of data.
A recent work along this line is [21].
Finally, how canM′ be defined such that it constitutes an absolute naturalness ref-
erence? In Section 2, we already identified the two limiting cases of total predictivity and
infinite fine-tuning. We also identified a threshold in between, when observables O1...m
are input parameters. To define an absolute reference for naturalness, this threshold
as well as the limit of total predictivity may be employed. This suggests two ways of
defining a reference model. Either one can consider that M′ is an ideal, fully natural
model satisfying O = Oex everywhere in its parameter space. We will denote this ideal
model as X . Or, M′ may be a hypothetical “puzzle”model, in which the O1...m would
be directly input parameters. This model will be denoted P. We call it a “puzzle”
model, because from the point of view of sensitivity, it stands at the threshold between
predictivity and fine-tuning.
These different possibilities for M′ and their implications will be discussed later in
the section. What we obtain up to now is a well-defined measure of naturalness, un-
der the form of a Bayes factor. Unlike in other approaches, a mapping (Jeffreys’ scale)
between this measure and our degree of belief exists. The measure is therefore usable,
and different applications are possible depending on what one defines as being (M′, d′).
Starting from now, we will continue the development to show that this probability for-
mulation, instead of being an alternative to the sensitivity formulation, actually embeds
it.
4.2 Apparition of a sensitivity measure
From this point until the end of the section, it is assumed that the measurement of
O is sufficiently precise, such that one can consider the Laplace approximation of the
likelihood function. That is, the log-likelihood can be expanded around a maximum
θmax ∈ Dex as
logLO(θ) ' logLmax + ∂
2 logLO
∂θi∂θj
∣∣∣∣
θmax
(θi − θimax)(θj − θjmax)
2!
, (14)
in which the first order derivatives of LO vanishes since θmax is an extremum. This ex-
pansion corresponds to approximating the likelihood as a (multivariate) normal law. Let
us re-write the right-handed term by introducing the Jacobian matrix of the observables
JO ij =
(
∂Oi
∂θj
)
,
∂2 logLO
∂Oi∂Oj JO ikJO jl
∣∣∣∣
θmax
(θk − θkmax)(θl − θlmax)
2!
. (15)
One recognizes in that expression the quantity ∂2 logLO/∂Oi∂Oj , which up to a minus
sign is the observed Fisher information associated to the O measurement, I{LO}(O).
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We rescale O by Oex to make appear a dimensionless Jacobian and a dimensionless
Fisher information associated to O/Oex, such that Eq. (15) becomes
∂2 logLO
∂logOi∂logOj JlogO ikJlogO jl
∣∣∣∣
θmax
(θk − θkmax)(θl − θlmax)
2!
. (16)
The dimensionless Fisher information −∂2 logLO/∂logOi∂logOj describes the amount
of relative uncertainty associated to O. We will denote it as Σ−1 from now on.
Given this expansion of LO, we can reconsider our central quantity, the Bayesian
evidence p(O = Oex|M, d). This evidence can be written as a continuous sum over all
the values of the parameters:
p(O = Oex|M, d) =
∫
D
LO(θ) p(θ)dθ . (17)
It is the average of LO(θ) weighted by the prior density of the model parameters
p(θ) = p(θ|M, d). We will denote the Fisher information associated to this prior density
I{p(θ)} = |V |−1, and designate |V |1/2 as the “prior volume”.
Provided that the likelihood is informative with respect to the prior, Eq. (17) takes
the form
p(O = Oex|M, d) = Lmax |Σ|
1/2
|V |1/2
∫
Dex
1
C
dσ(θ) . (18)
Here, dσ(θ) is the induced integration measure on the manifold Dex, and C is the Jaco-
bian factor,
C =
∣∣det (JlogOJ tlogO)∣∣1/2 . (19)
From the point of view of Fisher information, C measures how much information about
the parameters θ is contained in O/Oex regardless of the uncertainty Σ. The interesting
fact is that C is a generalized version of the sensitivity measure c, such that Eq. (18)
makes the link between the two formulations of naturalness.
Some remarks are in order. Firstly, Eq. (18) holds in the limit where C|V |1/2 
|Σ|1/2 over Dex. We will designate the likelihood as informative when this condition is
fulfilled. When the condition is not satisfied, the overlap between the likelihood and the
prior has to be taken into account properly, and the Bayesian evidence tends to Lmax.
Secondly, we emphasize that JlogOJ tlogO is indeed a m × m matrix. Its size does not
depend on the number of parameters, but on the number of observables. Thirdly, by
choosing a punctual prior, or if the other data d are sufficiently constraining, Dex is
reduced to a single point θ0 and the integral
∫
Dex C
−1dσ(θ) is reduced to C−1
∣∣
θ0
. In
such a situation, we get closer from the sensitivity definition, which is a local measure.
We also emphasize that the derivatives which appear within C depend on the choice
of prior. Indeed, in all generality, these derivatives are performed with respect to the
“prior repartition function” G(θ), defined such that p(θ)dθ = dG(θ). Let us illustrate
this fact by considering a single observable and a flat prior on all parameters, restricted
to the volume [a1, b1]×. . .×[an, bn]. The prior volume is |V |1/2 = (b1−a1)×. . .×(bn−an),
and the Jacobian factor is C =
√∑
i |∂logO/∂θi|2. Instead, if one chooses a logarithmic
prior for all parameters p(θi) ∝ θ−1i , the prior volume becomes |V |1/2 = (log b1−log a1)×
. . . × (log bn − log an), and the Jacobian factor becomes C =
√∑
i |∂logO/∂ log θi|2.
The derivatives in C are then made with respect to log θ instead of θ. In the case of
dimensionful parameters, the choice of the logarithmic prior has a particular meaning,
because it is the more objective prior.
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Through these several remarks, we can finally state that
∫
Dex C
−1dσ(θ) reduces to
the c measure of the sensitivity formulation, provided that one considers a single observ-
able, a single point in Dex, and that one gives logarithmic priors to the parameters. It is
more precisely the expression cb, used in [13], which is exactly reproduced. The measure
ca is an approximation of cb when one of the component of the gradient dominates.
Interestingly, the average
∫
Dex C
−1dσ(θ) has been proposed in [7], in an attempt to
normalize the c measure. In our approach this quantity arises naturally, and we also see
that in itself it does not help to interpret the c measure. On the other hand, the use of the
volume of parameter space has been proposed in [8], in an attempt to build an alternative
measure. These different ideas, somewhat intuitive as such, become rigorously usable
once they appear together through Eq. (18). Our approach also justifies Bayesian studies
which introduce C−1 as a “naturalness prior”. This is not new, it was already explained
in [5]. However, we add that the prior of the parameters has to correspond to the
derivatives made in C, to keep the approach consistent.
The factor C is a generalization of the c measure. Among other things, it tells
us what is the information content of several, possibly correlated observables. Let us
consider the case of two observables. In this case, C is nothing but the norm of the
wedge product of the gradients,
C = ‖∇logO1 ∧∇logO2‖ , (20)
which is also
C =
(
‖∇logO1‖2 ‖∇logO2‖2 − (∇logO1.∇logO2)2
)1/2
. (21)
It is instructive to discuss the behaviour of C depending on the correlation between the
two observables which is induced by the model. One can rewrite C as
C = C1C2
√
1− ρ2 , (22)
where C1 and C2 are the one-dimensional sensitivities and ρ is the correlation in the
model, defined by
ρ =
|∇logO1.∇logO2|
‖∇logO1‖ ‖∇logO2‖
. (23)
If the observables are independently predicted, the two gradients are orthogonal
and thus ρ = 0. Eq. 21 reduces in that case to the product of the one-dimensional C
measures. On the contrary, if the observables are correlated within the model, one has
ρ > 0 and C decreases. In the Bayesian point of view, this should be interpreted as
the fact that it is more economical for a model to predict correlated observables than
independent observables. One may be worried that Eq. (21) tends to zero in the limit of
total correlation, when the two observables are linearly dependent. However, the formula
does not apply in that limit. Indeed, recall that the condition for having informative
data is C|V |1/2  |Σ|1/2. It translates here as an upper bound on the correlation ρ,
ρ
√
1− |Σ||V |(C1C2)2 . (24)
For instance, for a pair of Gaussian measurements, one has |Σ|1/2 = σ1σ2
√
1− ρ2exp.
When Eq. (24) is not satisfied, the correlation is too large, such that the two observables
are not separately informative. That is, instead of two constraints, the model effectively
11
feels a single constraint Oˆ ≡ O1 ∼∝ O2. Instead of Eq. (21), it is then a one dimensional
sensitivity associated to Oˆ which appears in the Bayesian evidence Eq. (18). This dis-
cussion illustrates also the fact that C taken outside of the formula Eq. (18) can induce
misunderstandings, and has to be interpreted with care.
At this point, puzzling observations can be made about priors and the meaning of
logarithms which appear everywhere. What is after all the reason for having logO in
C? Is it for the sake of making C dimensionless? Or is it for the sake of measuring
a relative variation, as we naively stated in Section 2? Here we assumed that O is
dimensionful. By doing so, we avoid this discussion in a first time, since rescaling O by
Oex makes the C both dimensionless and measuring a relative variation. Also, although
the log in ∂ logO is suggestive of an objective prior, this remains just a way of writing
∂O/Oex. And, anyway, speaking about a prior for O actually does not makes sense for
the moment, as O is determined by the parameters. These observations will be resolved
when examining the Bayes factor BMP in the next subsection.
To summarize, we find that the sensitivity formulation of naturalness turns out to
be embedded in the probability formulation. The c measure, Eq. (11), turns out to
be a particular case of the factor C, arising in the Bayesian evidence Eq. (18). The
only assumption made to obtain this result is the Laplace approximation, i.e. that the
likelihood function can be reduced to a normal law. We will now examine the different
Bayes factors B that can be constructed, and what is the role taken by the C measure.
4.3 The different versions of B
4.3.1 BMX
As a warm-up, let us examine the Bayes factor comparing a modelM to the fully natural
model X ,
BMX =
p(O = Oex|M)
p(O = Oex|X ) . (25)
By definition, X satisfies O = Oex in all its parameter space. The evidence of this ideal
model is thus p(O = Oex|X ) = Lmax. Recall that Lmax is an overall normalization
constant, which will be canceled once we consider the ratio of evidences. Assuming that
the data O = Oex is informative for M, BMX takes the form
BMX = |Σ|1/2/|V |1/2
∫
Dex
C−1dσ(θ) . (26)
Clearly, since M cannot be more natural than X , BMX cannot be larger than one.
At most, it can tend to one, if M tends to be an ideal model like X . Equation (26)
is not valid in this limit, as it implies that data is not informative for M anymore.
Let us interpret what Eq. (26) is telling us as a Bayes factor. One sees that BMX
decreases with |Σ|. It is because when the constraint O = Oex becomes more precise,
M is penalized, but not X . Also, BMX decreases as |V | increases, because it penalizes
the waste of parameter space of M excluded by O = Oex. Finally, BMX also decreases
with the sensitivity C. C measures the amount of information that O carries about the
parameters ofM. The largest C is, the more O contains information, and the more the
constraint O = Oex is strong for M, regardless of the experimental uncertainty.
BMX is certainly useful to understand the content of the Bayesian evidence. On the
other hand, it is a priori not very useful in a concrete application, as it will just tell us
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that the model under consideration is less good than the ideal model. Does it provide
a good basis to give an absolute interpretation to C? The interpretation of C would
inevitably depend on |Σ|. It would be necessary that |Σ| be intrinsically bounded from
below, independently on the details of the experimental observations. This can actually
happen, for instance in quantum theories when observables do not commute. But, as
far as we know, nothing of this kind happens in a domain of physics having naturalness
issues.
4.3.2 BMP
Consider now the Bayes factor comparing the model M to a model P in which the
observables O1...m (or any linear combination of them) are directly input parameters,
such that C = 1. It is defined by
BMP =
p(O = Oex|M)
p(O = Oex|P) . (27)
We recall that the model P is dubbed as “puzzle”, since from the point of view of
sensitivity, it is at the limit between predictivity and fine-tuning. In this case, the prior
density for O will enter in the game, as O itself is an input parameter of P.
The Bayesian evidence of P is
p(O = Oex|P) = Lmax |Σ|
1/2
|VO|1/2
. (28)
|VO|1/2 is the prior volume associated to the parameter O. In this expression, one
can introduce the ratio O/Oex, as we did for the Bayesian evidence of M, p(O =
Oex|M), given in Eq. (18). By doing so, Σ is the same relative uncertainty Σ =
−∂2 logLO/∂logOi∂logOj as the one which appears in p(O = Oex|M). The two |Σ|1/2
thus cancel in BMP , such that
BMP =
|VO|1/2
|V |1/2
∫
Dex
1
C
dσ(θ) . (29)
With this choice, C ∝ ∂ logO/∂ . . ., and the prior volume VO is dimensionless. VO is
however not determined. To do so, the prior of O would need to be specified.
To go further and specify a particular prior for VO, it is necessary to impose a
condition, referring to some principle. Interestingly, there are two different principles,
leading to two different conditions, which lead to the same result. Firstly, one can invoke
the principle of indifference–introduced in Section 3. Applied to a dimensionful quantity,
it states that our a priori degree of belief should not depend on the unit scale. This is
translated as the invariance of p(O|P) under the transformation O → O × b, which
imposes the logarithmic prior p(O|P) ∝ O−1.
But there is a second principle which gives the same result. In this section, we
restricted our discussion to a dimensionful O. However, there is no specification made
about the actual dimension of O. It seems legitimate to require that the whole approach
leads to the same outcome whatever the dimension of O is. Said differently, we require
that the measure of naturalness should not depend on a redefinition of O changing its
dimension. We will design this property as “consistency” of the naturalness measure.
It is translated as the invariance of BMP under the transformation O → Oa. The
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consequence of imposing this condition is once again that p(O|P) be the logarithmic
prior p(O|P) ∝ O−1.
We thus find that the logarithmic prior is independently motivated by the principle
of indifference and by the consistency of the measure. This consistency condition is
a kind of principle of indifference, applied to a Bayes factor instead of a probability.
Depending on the point of view adopted, one can either claim that the consistency of
the measure leads automatically to an objective prior, or that the principle of indifference
leads automatically to a consistent measure. In any case, BMP is finally invariant under
the transformation O → b×Oa.
Provided that prior volumes of both M and P can be bounded, BMP provides a
kind of absolute scale to C. As expected, the “puzzle” model P plays the role of a
reference in terms of sensitivity, to which M can be compared. Once the volumes are
determined, C is directly related to Jeffreys’ scale. The interpretation of C in terms
of degree of belief does not depend on the definition of O. Indeed, any redefinition of
O is accompanied with a change in |VO|1/2 =
∫
d logO, such that the interpretation of
C remains always the same. For instance, in the gauge hierarchy problem, it does not
matter anymore to take O = mZ or O = m2Z , because this is compensated in the prior
volume of mZ ,
∫
d logmZ →
∫
d logm2Z . This consistency property resolves one of the
issues raised in Section 2.
4.3.3 Relative naturalness
Finally, let us compare two hypothesis (M0, d0) and (M1, d1). We make the assumption
that the piece of data O = Oex is informative for both models. The Bayes factor
B01 =
p(O = Oex|M0, d0)
p(O = Oex|M1, d1) (30)
takes the form
B01 =
|V1|1/2
|V0|1/2
∫
D0 ex
C−10 dσ(θ)
(∫
D1 ex
C1
−1dσ(θ)
)−1
. (31)
Here, one can see clearly that this naturalness measure puts in balance both the prior
volumes, and the sensitivities integrated over the parameter space. M0 andM1 can be
two different models, or the same model with different priors, or associated to different
data d0 and d1. When the two models are the same, one has C0 = C1, but the two
domains of integration are still different. If the two hypothesis differ only by the data
d0 6= d1, B gives the “naturalness price” between the two pieces of data. For example,
d0 could be the pre-LHC constraint on SUSY particle masses, and d1 the constraint once
LHC measurements are taken into account.
Within a same model M, one can make the choice of punctual priors, which select
two different points θ0, θ1 of Dex. In that case, the prior volumes cancel, leaving only
the Bayes factor
B01 =
C1
C0
. (32)
The Bayes factor, then, is simply reduced to the comparison of the sensitivities. This
quantity shows clearly that the relative sensitivity within a model has to be interpreted
on the basis of Jeffreys’ scale. It is also true for the usual c measure, which is a particular
case of C. This finishes resolving all the issues raised in Section 2.
14
4.4 Generalization and comments
To sum up, the Bayes factor BMP provides a handle on the absolute interpretation
of C, and sets the functional form of all quantities, once either the consistency or the
indifference principle are required. The relative versions of B contain various possibilities
of applications, some of them being reminiscent of previous work done in the literature.
We will now discuss about generalization, absolute naturalness and some implications
of this approach.
4.4.1 The general case
Before all, let us explain why we keep a number m of observables O1...m smaller or equal
to the number of parameters n. If one has n observables, non-proportional to each other,
the model is fully constrained, i.e. Dex has dimension zero. The likelihood function gets
in that case one or several maxima, with an uncertainty Σ associated to each of them. If
one adds a new constraint, the effect will be to increase the precision, i.e. reduce Σ, and
possibly decrease the maximum of likelihood, if this new constraint is not in agreement
with the n previous. But from the point of view of the C measure, this new constraint
is necessarily reduced, around the maximum, to a linear combination of the n others.
For that reason, the contribution of this new constraint vanishes in the determinant
contained in the Jacobian factor C, and thus cannot influence the sensitivity. Therefore,
for the purpose of the naturalness study, it is sufficient to keep m ≤ n.
The second assumption we made in the beginning of Sect. 4 was that our observ-
ables and parameters were dimensionful. We found that either applying the indifference
principle or requiring consistency of the naturalness measure leads to the invariance of
p(O) under logO → logO + b and of BMP under logO → a × logO + b, where a is
a m × m matrix and b a m-vector. These conditions imply the use of the logarith-
mic prior, such that C = | det(JlogOJ tlogO)|1/2, where JlogO = ∂ logOi/∂ log θj , and
VO =
∫
dm logOi, V =
∫
dn log θj . All these properties are the consequences of consid-
ering that a transformation law, the change in unit scale, is irrelevant for our degree of
belief about the problem. Let us now go to the general case, by considering arbitrary,
possibly dimensionless, observables and parameters. All the results can be generalized,
provided the existence of an irrelevant transformation. Let us assume that the transfor-
mation G(O)→ G(O) + b and the transformation H(θ)→ H(θ) + c do not modify our
degree of belief. Then, the naturalness measure is invariant under G(O)→ a×G(O)+b,
the sensitivity takes the form C = |det(JG(O)J tG(O))|1/2, where JG(O) = ∂G(O)i/∂H(θ)j ,
and the prior volumes are VO =
∫
dmG(Oi), V =
∫
dnH(θj).
What we stated above is based on the existence of a continuous irrelevant transfor-
mation. However, other kinds of conditions, possibly less obvious, can also be found.
For instance, when a theory is isomorphic to itself under a duality transformation, it is
possible to find the objective priors of parameters transforming non trivially under the
duality.
Finally, it is important to recall that results obtained in Bayesian statistics depend
to some extent on the parametrization of the problem. The choice of parametrization is
somehow intricate with the choice of prior for the parameters. The indifference principle
(Sect. 3) plays a crucial role with respect to this issue. It allows us to minimize the
amount of information contained in the priors, or, said differently, it helps to find a
preferred, objective parametrization. For example, it happens that a dimensionless
parameter, whose objective prior is unknown, can be seen as a ratio of two dimensionful
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parameters. This is for instance the case of tanβ ≡ vu/vd in the MSSM. Given that
the objective prior of dimensionful parameters is known, this provides the (non-trivial)
objective prior of the dimensionless parameter. Or equivalently, one can choose these
dimensionful parameters as input (we refer to [28] for an application to the MSSM).
By construction, our Bayesian approach to naturalness inherits all of these features.
However, an extra subtlety is that there is both a freedom of parameterization on the
parameters θi and the observable O. Without referring to the indifference principle,
there is no mean to favor a particular parametrization, and the naturalness measure is
dependent on this parametrization. Once applied, the indifference principle provides the
objective priors for both the θi and O (as discussed in the analysis of BMP). As a result,
we end up with a unique naturalness measure, depending only on the transformations
properties associated with the indifference principle. The general result is given above
in this section. Speaking more formally, the indifference principle defines an equivalence
class among the parametrizations, and the naturalness measure turns out to be an in-
variant of this equivalence class. In the usual example of dimensionful parameters, the
transformation definining the equivalence class is O → b×Oa. This is nothing but the
2d set of quantities of arbitrary dimensions. As a consequence, whatever the dimension
of O, e.g. O ≡ mZ , m2Z , or 3×m100Z , the naturalness measure remains the same.
4.4.2 About absolute naturalness
The ‘puzzle’ model P provides a reference in terms of naturalness. It is the only sensible
reference we are able to find. But how can it be defined in practice ? Let us try to do
this for the gauge-hierarchy problem.
The Bayes factor associated to this problem is
BMP =
p(mZ = mZ ex|M, d)
p(mZ = mZ ex|P, d′) . (33)
The pieces of data d and d′ have to be identical, as our goal is not to compare different
data. Which information is contained in d ? By construction, in our approach, all
experimental information available is splitted into two categories. There is the one which
contributes to indicate what the electroweak scale is, which is called mZ = mZ ex, and
the one which doesn’t, which is called d. With only the knowledge d, one would know for
example the strength of gravity and gauge interactions, the fermion and hadron masses,
but not the electroweak boson masses neither the Fermi constant. Such a situation is
of course impossible to imagine in practice, but here we are simply splitting a set of
existing information, regardless of the way they were obtained.
Now, what should P be ? It is a model which predicts data d and has mZ both as an
input and an output. We can imagine that it is a kind of quantum field theory in which
the weak scale does not receive any quadratic corrections, for some unknown reason.
What should be the prior volume of mZ ? We know both from the indifference principle
and consistency of the measure that mZ should have a logarithmic prior. The bounds
of this density remain to be found. Given that d contains the knowledge of gravity, P
has a cutoff at the Planck mass, so mZ ≤ MPl. On the other hand, as d contains the
quark masses, mZ is bounded from below due to unitarity of quark scattering by weak
currents (see [24]), which implies roughly mZ & 10 GeV. The prior volume VmZ in the
model P is therefore VmZ = log(MPl/10 GeV) ≈ 40.0. This completes the definition of
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P. Using Laplace approximation, the Bayes factor is
BMP =
|VmZ |1/2
|V |1/2
∫
Dex
1
CmZ
dσ(θ) , (34)
where CmZ ∝ ∂ logmZ/∂ . . . , and |V | is the prior volume of M. With this equation,
for any choice of M, ∫Dex C−1mZdσ(θ) is equal to Jeffrey’s scale up to a known constant.
Therefore we get the absolute interpretation of the sensitivity measure.
One may or not be satisfied with this approach. In any case, it illustrates that it is
not so obvious to define P in practice. This, however, does not take away the general
results obtained by studying BMP .
4.4.3 Second order fine-tuning
When considering a naturalness map, the following interrogation often appears. The
interest of a naturalness map is to select regions of the parameter space which have a
relatively low fine-tuning. But suppose that a very tiny region of the parameter space
has a very small C, while C is sensibly larger around, in at least one direction. Selecting
this tiny region and discarding the zone around would be itself an action of fine-tuning!
We will design that issue as a “second order fine-tuning”. How is this taken into account
in our framework?
It is easy to guess that there is a relation to the choice of punctual priors, which select
single points of Dex. Indeed, if 1/C was integrated around the tiny zone with small C,
the particularity of that zone would disappear. Formally, the action of selecting regions
with low fine-tuning corresponds to impose a prior such that C ≤ Cmin+∆C, where ∆C
is a level of tolerance, and Cmin is a minimal value. One can construct a Bayes factor
comparing two regions D0 ex, D1 ex of the parameter space, containing the minima C0min,
C1min, respectively, and with the requirement of an upper bound on C. Several versions
can be built, depending for example whether Cmin is considered as a common value,
or if Cmin = C1,0min respectively. These versions corresponds to different reasonings.
Provided that C−1 can be approximated over the domain considered, such Bayes factors
can be computed analytically.
For example, let us consider the Bayes factor comparing two regions D0 ex, D1 ex of
the parameter space, containing minima C0min, C1min which are not on the boundaries.
We impose the condition C ≤ Cmin + ∆C, where Cmin is a common value. It can be
min(C0,min, C1,min) or a smaller value. It does not matter, since it will not appear in
the final result. These two domains are denoted as D′0 ex, D′1 ex. The Bayes factor reads
B01 =
∫
D′0 ex
C−1dσ(θ)
(∫
D′1 ex
C−1dσ(θ)
)−1
. (35)
When ∆C is not too large, one can take the Laplace approximation of C around C0min
and C1min. In that limit, the integration can be done, and one obtains the Hessian of
logC
H = det(∇i∇j logC)|Cmin . (36)
As by assumption, both boundaries ∂D′i ex are inside the corresponding boundaries
∂Di ex, the Bayes factor reduces to
B01 =
C1min
C0min
H
1/2
1
H
1/2
0
. (37)
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We can see that a new factor H
1/2
1 /H
1/2
0 appears in addition to C1min/C0min. This is
the quantity which renders account for the second order fine-tuning.
More generally, for Bayes factors where the minima are on the boundaries, there
will be contributions of the form
B01 ∝
∏
i
∣∣∣∣∂C∂θi
∣∣∣∣
C1min
∣∣∣∣∂θi∂C
∣∣∣∣
C0min
(38)
coming in. Terms in Eqs (37),(38) provide a comparison of the steepness of C around
the two minima. This is properly quantified and interpreted in terms of naturalness with
the Bayesian approach.
4.4.4 The top Yukawa in the gauge hierarchy problem
A recurring question about the gauge hierarchy problem is whether or not the top quark
Yukawa coupling yt should be considered as an input parameter, such that the derivative
∂mZ/∂yt appear in the CmZ measure. On one hand, one can think of yt as a simple
constant, and not a parameter. In that case, it should not appear in CmZ . On the other
hand, one can think of it as an input parameter, fixed by the experiment. In that case,
yt must appear in the CmZ measure. So what is the right point of view? Surprisingly,
it is the first proposition which makes sense. To understand this, we have to examine
more carefully the second proposition.
Indeed, the choice of considering yt as an input parameter or a constant is just a
matter of viewpoint, and should not modify the information content of our study. This
implies that if yt is taken as an input parameter, one has to add to the set of experimental
constraints the top quark mass measurement, mt = mt ex. But the observables mZ and
mt are not independent in the model. Therefore, to study naturalness of the gauge-
hierarchy problem, they need to be simultaneously taken into account. It is thus the
combined sensitivity CmZ ,mt which has to be used when yt is seen as an input parameter.
At this point, it is instructive to wonder what is the common fine-tuning associated
to a generic observable O and an observable Θ which is directly an input parameter.
The set of the input parameters is denoted as pi = (θj ,Θ). We assume a logarithmic
prior for all quantities for concreteness. If O and Θ are independent in the model, the
common sensitivity
CO,Θ =
∥∥∥∥∂ logO∂ log pi ∧ ∂Θ∂ log pi
∥∥∥∥ (39)
factorizes and reduces to
CO =
∥∥∥∥∂ logO∂ log θi
∥∥∥∥ , (40)
given that CΘ = 1. But what happens when the two observables are correlated? It turns
out that the answer is the same. Whatever the “puzzle” observable Θ is, the sensitivity
reduces always to CO,Θ = CO. We emphasize that, although all priors are chosen to be
logarithmic there, these kinds of results hold whatever the priors are.
Let us come back to the top Yukawa and the CmZ ,mt measure. The previous remark
does not apply directly, because the observable is not yt, but rather the top mass mt =
yt × v. Thus yt does not play the same role as Θ. However, the outcome will in fact be
the same. We denote the set of input parameters as pi = (θj , yt). The objective prior of
mt is logarithmic, and it implies that the prior of yt is also logarithmic. We also assume
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for simplicity that the priors of the θj are logarithmic. The sensitivity is then∥∥∥∥CmZ ,mt = ∂ logmZ∂ log pi ∧ ∂ log(vyt)∂ log pi
∥∥∥∥ . (41)
As mZ is directly related to v, the gradients ∂ logmZ/∂ log pi and ∂ log v/∂ log pi are
colinear. The v contribution therefore vanishes in the sensitivity measure. The remaining
part contains yt, which plays the same role as Θ in the previous paragraph. As a
consequence the sensitivity reduces to CmZ , without the parameter yt,
CmZ ,mt =
∥∥∥∥∂ logmZ∂ log θi
∥∥∥∥ . (42)
This result holds whatever the priors are. Thus, to reply to the initial question, the
second proposition gives in fact the same result as the first proposition, after a careful
examination: yt should not appear in CmZ .
4.4.5 Consequences of LHC searches
The existence of a scalar resonance whose properties are roughly compatible with the one
of a Higgs boson has been established beyond reasonable doubt at the LHC [22,23]. The
mass of this new state is a a stringent constraint on many models of new physics. Some of
them are almost excluded, baring some very specific choices of parameters. As a result,
this constitutes a new naturalness problem associated to the Higgs mass constraint. It
would be therefore particularly appropriate to study the fine-tuning related to the Higgs,
either inside the parameter space of a model, or comparing two different models. The
naturalness measure to use for such study is
B01 =
p(mh = mh ex,mZ = mZ ex)|M0)
p(mh = mh ex,mZ = mZ ex)|M1) . (43)
We emphasize once again that the two observables mh and mZ , both independently
responsible of some amount of fine-tuning, should not be treated separately, because
their predictions are correlated in the models.
On the other hand, searches at the LHC and other experiments do not have, up
to now, shown conclusive evidence of existence of Beyond Standard Model phyics. As
the idea of new physics (NP) at the multiTeV scale is in part motivated by the gauge-
hierarchy problem, one can wonder to which extent NP models are more natural than the
Standard Model, given the increasing exclusion limits. Let us answer to this question
in a very simplified way. For concreteness, we assume the SM to be valid up to the
Planck scale. As the origin of the gauge-hierarchy problem is an issue of cancellations
between square mass parameters, we will consider a one-parameter “model” embedding
this property. That is, we just define the EW scale as given by m2Z = M
2
Pl(1 − δ). We
also consider a BSM model suppressing the quadratic corrections to the EW scale at a
scale M˜ < MPl. The EW scale is thus given by m
2
Z = M˜
2(1− δ) in this model. Picking
similar priors for the δ in each hypothesis, the naturalness measure turns out to be
BNP,SM ≈ M
2
Pl
M˜2
. (44)
We can see that, unless M˜ is close from MPl, this ratio indicates an extremely strong
fine-tuning of the SM, far beyond the 150 typical value indicated in Jeffrey’s scale. If
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for instance M˜ ≈ 100 TeV, one gets BNP,SM ≈ 1026. We emphasize that, for the sake of
comparing the SM to a NP model improving substantially the gauge-hierarchy problem,
there is no need to set up a more evolved analysis. This estimation embeds the large
leading contribution, which flushes away any other subleading effects.
5 Gauge hierarchy problem and neutralino dark matter in
the cMSSM
In this section, we apply our results to a concrete problem. We choose to study the
naturalness of a classic supersymmetric model, the constrained MSSM (cMSSM), taking
into account both the gauge hierarchy problem and the fine-tuning of neutralino dark
matter.
Supersymmetry solves the gauge hierarchy problem by embedding the Standard
Model fields into supermultiplets, which do not generate quadratic corrections to the
Higgs mass. The simplest realistic model this one can build is called the Minimal Su-
persymmetric Standard Model (MSSM). But the superparticles which accompany the
SM particles in the supermultiplets are experimentally constrained to be heavier than
their standard partner. This implies that supersymmetry has to be broken. However,
with broken SUSY, the gauge-hierarchy problem is not completely solved. Instead, it
remains in the form of a certain amount of special cancellations between the SUSY pa-
rameters, of typical scale MSUSY , necessary to reproduce the Z boson mass. MSUSY
is constrained both through direct and indirect observations, and the LHC experiments
are currently improving these direct limits (see e.g. summary plots of Atlas [26] and
CMS [27]). Roughly speaking, MSUSY is at least O(TeV), one order of magnitude above
the Z mass mZ ≈ 91 GeV.
One of the simplest and widely studied version of the MSSM with broken SUSY is
the constrained MSSM (cMSSM). The parameters of that model are a common gaugino
mass m1/2, a common scalar mass m
2
0, a common scalar trilinear coupling A0 ≡ aij/yij ,
the ratio of the two Higgs vevs tanβ = 〈Hu〉 / 〈Hd〉, and the sign of the SUSY Higgs
mass term, sign(µ) (see e.g. [25] for an introduction to SUSY models). However, this
is a setup which already takes into account mZ = mZ ex. As we are interested in the
fine-tuning induced by mZ = mZ ex, this constraint must not be incorporated in the
model in the first place. Therefore a new input parameter has to be introduced. It
is in fact interesting to trade tanβ for the dimensionful parameters µ and Bµ of the
Higgs sector. Indeed, whereas it is not obvious to find an objective density for tanβ,
the objective densities of µ and Bµ are clearly logarithmic. In practice, it is the former
parametrization of the model which is used. In that case, the objective prior of tanβ
has to be inferred from the priors of µ and Bµ. This remark was made in the paper [28],
where the resulting density is called “REWSB prior”.
Also, the MSSM has another celebrated feature. Its mass spectrum contains the
neutralino, a fermion charged only under the weak force, and which is a mixture of neu-
tral Higgsinos and gauginos. If the lightest neutralino χ˜01 is the lightest particle of the
SUSY spectrum, and if a remnant of the U(1)R symmetry of the SUSY algebra is still
present, it cannot decay directly into SM particles and is therefore stable. Such a particle
is a good dark matter candidate. Under the assumptions that the Cosmological Stan-
dard Model is valid in the early universe, and that the neutralinos were at the thermal
equilibrium for some period, today’s neutralino density can be precisely predicted using
the Boltzmann equation. This density is the relic remaining after thermal freeze-out,
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when the neutralino annihilation rate vanishes due to the expansion of the universe. The
relic density predicted strongly depends on the masses and compositions of all particles
of the spectrum.
The latest release of the dark matter relic density measured by WMAP7 is Ωh2ex =
0.1126 ± 0.0036 [29]. One can know where this constraint is satisfied in the plan
(m1/2,m0) by looking at the lines in plots of Fig. 1. This figure will be described
in details below. Experimental uncertainty, by construction, does not appear in the
plots. Lines are set wide only to ease the reading of the color code. Typically, in the
cMSSM, the dark matter relic density predicted is a bit large compared to the obser-
vation. To reproduce this experimental constraint, it is necessary that one or several
processes of neutralino annihilation be particularly efficient [30]. There are at least four
such processes in the cMSSM.
Firstly, the neutralinos can annihilate through the exchange of a scalar. But this
mechanism is only efficient for light sparticles, which are more and more excluded by the
LHC. Secondly, the annihilation through the exchange of a Higgsino or SU(2) gaugino
is efficient if the mixing with those states is large enough. This happens near the “No
EWSB” zone. Thirdly, a coannihilation with a slepton may dominate if it is close from
the neutralino mass, and if both particles are not too heavy. This happens near the
“Charged LSP” zone. Finally, the exchange of a CP-odd higgs A0 is enhanced near the
resonance pole, when mA0 ≈ 2mχ˜01 . This happens at large tanβ and is dubbed “A-pole
funnel”.
But relying on the efficiency of such processes to obtain the correct value for Ωh2
requires a rather precise adjustment of parameters. It is therefore an act of fine-tuning.
So if one wants to explain dark matter by the neutralino, one ends up with two natural-
ness problems, one induced by the piece of information mZ = mZ ex and the other due
to Ω = Ωex. To study fine-tuning in the cMSSM, it is therefore the common sensitivity,
CmZ ,Ωh2 which must be used. From the sensitivity point of view, one has to consider
the set of fundamental parameters pi = (m1/2,m
2
0, A0, µ,Bµ). All of those parameters
are defined at the GUT scale. They all have a logarithmic prior as objective density.
On the other hand, although Ω = ρCDM/ρc is a density rescaled to be made dimension-
less, ρCDM is dimensionful, so it necessitates a logarithmic prior as well. The common
sensitivity measure is therefore
CmZ ,Ω =
∥∥∥∥∂ logmZ∂ log pi ∧ ∂ log Ωh
2
∂ log pi
∥∥∥∥ . (45)
We assume that the experimental uncertainties are sufficiently small, such that Eq. (45)
holds for all the parameter space. This sensitivity will be denoted as C from now on.
In the MSSM, the top quark mass is given by mt = ytv sinβ. Thus rigorously, yt
should not be taken as a constant, since what we explained in Subsection 4.4 about the
top Yukawa does not hold here due to the presence of sinβ. To stay exact, it would
be necessary to consider the sensitivity associated to the three observables, CmZ ,Ω,mt .
However, the correction induced from adding the observable mt is small, because in the
sinβ contribution the derivative ∂ log sinβ/∂ log yt is dominant over the other deriva-
tives. Therefore we choose to work only with the observables mZ , Ωh
2, and keep yt as
a constant.
We evaluated the dark matter relic density, the sensitivity C and the SUSY spectrum
over slices of the parameter space of the cMSSM. Our analysis was realized using a modi-
fied version of the spectrum calculator SoftSUSY [31] interfaced with MicrOMEGAs2.4 [32]
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to compute the dark matter relic density. In spectrum calculators, these are not µ and
Bµ which are input parameters, but mZ and tanβ. This is already taken into account
in SoftSUSY to compute the mZ derivatives, but it has to be carefully considered when
implementing the Ωh2 derivatives. The results obtained are presented in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 shows slices of the parameter space with A0 = 0, sign(µ) = 1 and mt =
172.4 GeV, for tanβ = 10 and 50. The low mass region of the parameter space is
increasingly excluded by the LHC bounds on sparticle masses (see [26, 27]). Instead
of showing a particular limit, we prefer to plot the gluino and lightest squark masses,
and leave the choice to the reader to apply his preferred bound. All the plots display
logarithm of the sensitivity. Following our results of Section 4, the difference between
two points 1 and 2 is given by | logC2 − logC1| = ∆ logC, which has to be interpreted
on the basis of Jeffreys’ scale. That is, ∆ logC = 1, 2.5, 5 correspond to weak, moderate
and strong evidence in favour of point 1, respectively. The statements about naturalness
that we will make when discussing the plots are based on this scale.
Plots in the upper line show maps of electroweak fine-tuning. The fact that logCmZ
drops down near the “No EWSB” zone is due to a feature of the MSSM renormalization
group equations, known as the mechanism of “focus point” [33]. In short, the low scale
value of the Higgs soft mass m2Hu becomes generically small in this region, such that
the cancellations required to reproduce the Z mass are less important. This feature also
implies a large higgsino fraction for the neutralino, so that the experimental value of
Ωh2 can be reproduced. In this zone of the parameter space, the predictions of mZ and
Ωh2 are therefore particularly correlated by the model.
Plots in the center line show the dark matter fine-tuning. In the tanβ = 10 slice,
one can see that the coannihilation region has a very strong fine-tuning compared to
the focus point region. Formally, the coannihilation region continues all along the “
charged LSP zone ” with an increasing fine-tuning, but points are so fine-tuned that the
numerical analysis does not render them. In the tanβ = 50 slice, one can see that the
A-pole funnel and the focus point region have sensibly the same naturalness. Relative to
the tanβ = 10 focus point, these regions have a weak to moderate fine-tuning. On the
other hand, they are strongly more natural than the tanβ = 10 coannihilation region.
At tanβ = 50, some very fine-tuned coannihilations can also occur on the border, but
are not shown on the plot. Dark matter fine-tuning has been previously investigated in
the literature, see e.g. [3, 34], with slightly different definitions for CΩ.
Finally, plots shown in the lower line are for the combined electroweak and dark
matter fine-tuning measure logCmZ ,Ω. Compared to the dark matter fine-tuning alone,
here the C measure increases with M1/2 due to the gauge hierarchy problem. In the
tanβ = 10 slice, the coannihilation region is still strongly fine-tuned with respect to the
focus point region. In the tanβ = 50 slice, the fine-tuning of the focus point region
increases by ∆ logC ≈ 5 between m1/2 = 500 GeV and 1500 GeV. At low m1/2, this
region is the most favored. At high m1/2, it is moderately fine-tuned compared to the
focus point region at tanβ = 10. The A-pole funnel and the focus point region at high
M1/2 are only moderately preferred to the tanβ = 10 coannihilation region.
6 Conclusion
The degree of naturalness is often intuitively defined as a sensitivity, although this
approach suffers from several conceptual flaws. We propose a different definition to
formalize naturalness, working in the framework provided by Bayesian statistics. This
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Figure 1: Quantified naturalness in the cMSSM. All of these plots are for A0 = 0, sign(µ) = 1
and mt = 172.4 GeV, with tanβ = 10 and 50 for left and right panels. m1/2 and m0 are given
in GeV units.
Top row: Maps of the logarithm of the electroweak fine-tuning measure CmZ , normalized to the
point of minimal fine-tuning. Center row: Maps of the logarithm of the dark matter fine-tuning
measure CΩ. Measure on both plots has the same normalization. Bottom row: Maps of the
logarithm of the combined electroweak and dark matter fine-tuning measure CmZ ,Ω. Measure
on both plots has the same normalization.
Blue and dark blue isolines show the mass of the gluino and the lightest squark with steps of
500 GeV. Following Jeffreys’ scale, the relative degree of belief between two points 1 and 2 is
given by | log(C2/C1)|, such that threshold values 1, 2.5 and 5 correspond to weak, moderate
and strong evidence for point 1, respectively.
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approach is self-consistent, and interestingly, turns out to embed the usual sensitivity
definition in a generalized form.
So our approach is not an alternative. It appears that the sensitivity is actually
a piece, intuitively guessed, of a larger setting. It is not consistent when taken alone,
but the flaws find an explanation once the embedding in the Bayesian framework is
done. Somehow, the essential missing piece was the notion of prior volume, which is
also intuitive on its own. In this paper, we work out the consistent framework bringing
together these notions.
The naturalness measure which appears in this framework is a Bayes factor. The
link between the naturalness measure and our degree of belief, which was missing so
far, is therefore automatically provided by Jeffreys’ scale. The generalized sensitivity
which emerges takes into account the fine-tuning of an arbitrary number of correlated
observables. We discussed in details the two observable case.
By studying the Bayes factor involving a ‘puzzle’ model, we found that either the
principle of indifference or consistency of the measure are setting the functional form of
all quantities. For the sensitivity, it entails that these are the objective prior repartition
functions, both for parameters and observables, which appear in the derivatives. As the
‘puzzle’ model is a reference in terms of sensitivity, this Bayes factor gives a handle on
the absolute interpretation of C.
The Bayesian approach resolves without ambiguity the question of whether or not
the top Yukawa should enter in the gauge-hierarchy measure CmZ . Also, it accounts for
the “second order fine-tuning”, which is induced when it is necessary to adjust precisely a
parameter to select a zone with small fine-tuning in the parameter space. Consequences
of recent LHC searches are also discussed.
We present a simple illustration of our results by examining the naturalness of a su-
persymmetric model, the cMSSM. The sensitivity formulas associated to the electroweak
scale and dark matter relic density, taken separately or together, are well-defined, and
differ from some work in the literature. By using Jeffreys’ scale, we make statements
about naturalness of the different dark matter annihilation regions. Roughly speaking,
the focus point region is the winner of the naturalness comparisons, while the coannihi-
lation region comes last with a strong evidence gap.
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Appendix
A Naturalness problems in particle physics and cosmology
In this Appendix, we recall some of the main naturalness problems. These are the most
commonly discussed, but the list is not intended to be exhaustive.
• Gauge hierarchy problem [25]: The electroweak scale, often represented by the
Z boson mass mZ , is O(100 GeV). On the other hand, the Planck scale MPl =√
~c/8piGN = 2.4 × 1018 GeV, sets the scale at which the theory of quantum
gravity appears. Why is the electroweak scale so small compared to MPl, while it
should receive O(M2Pl) quantum contributions?
• Strong CP puzzle [35]: From neutron electric dipole measurement, one deduces
that the θ angle, contributing to the QCD lagrangian LQCD ⊃ −1/4g2GµνGµν +
θ/16pi2GµνG˜µν , is very small, θ < 10
−12, while it could take values in [−pi, pi].
Then, why is it so close to zero?
• Flavour puzzle [36]: Ratios of successive SM fermion mass eigenvalues, as well as
CKM angles, are all roughly of the same order. Why do they follow this particular
structure?
• Cosmological constant problem [37]: The cosmological constant Λ, which ap-
pears in Einstein’s equations Rµν − 12gµνR = 8piGNTµν + Λgµν , is estimated to
be O(10−47) GeV4 by fitting the Standard Cosmological Model to CMB, large
scale structures, supernovae data. Within quantum field theories, it should receive
O(M4Pl) contributions, (or O(M
4
SUSY ) if there is SUSY). Then why is it so small?
• Flatness problem [38]: In the Standard Cosmological Model, the curvature of
universe is given by 1/R2 = H2(ρ/ρc−1), where H is the Hubble constant, ρ is the
total energy density contained in the universe, and ρc = 3H
2/8piGN . ρ/ρc − 1 is
estimated to be less than 0.01, and O(10−61) at the Planck era. Why the universe
had such a small curvature?
• Cosmic coincidence [39]: Why are the densities of matter and vaccum energy of
same order of magnitude, i.e. ρM ∼ ρΛ? And why now?
25
References
[1] J. R. Ellis, K. Enqvist, D. V. Nanopoulos and F. Zwirner, “Observables In Low-
Energy Superstring Models”, Mod. Phys. Lett. A 1, 57 (1986).
[2] R. Barbieri and G. F. Giudice, “Upper Bounds on Supersymmetric Particle Masses”,
Nucl. Phys. B 306, 63 (1988).
[3] S. Cassel, D. M. Ghilencea and G. G. Ross, “Testing SUSY at the LHC: Electroweak
and Dark matter fine tuning at two-loop order” Nucl. Phys. B 835, 110 (2010)
[arXiv:1001.3884 [hep-ph]].
[4] A. Strumia, “The fine-tuning price of the early LHC”, JHEP 1104, 073 (2011)
[arXiv:1101.2195 [hep-ph]].
[5] M. E. Cabrera, J. A. Casas and R. Ruiz de Austri, “Bayesian approach and Natu-
ralness in MSSM analyses for the LHC”, JHEP 0903, 075 (2009) [arXiv:0812.0536
[hep-ph]].
[6] B. C. Allanach, “Naturalness priors and fits to the constrained minimal supersym-
metric standard model”, Phys. Lett. B 635, 123 (2006) [arXiv:hep-ph/0601089].
[7] G. W. Anderson and D. J. Castano, “Measures of fine tuning”, Phys. Lett. B 347,
300 (1995) [arXiv:hep-ph/9409419].
[8] P. Athron and D. J. . Miller, “A New Measure of Fine Tuning”, Phys. Rev. D 76,
075010 (2007) [arXiv:0705.2241 [hep-ph]].
[9] P. Ciafaloni and A. Strumia, “Naturalness upper bounds on gauge mediated soft
terms”, Nucl. Phys. B 494, 41 (1997) [arXiv:hep-ph/9611204].
[10] K. L. Chan, U. Chattopadhyay and P. Nath, Phys. Rev. D 58, 096004 (1998) [hep-
ph/9710473].
[11] R. Barbieri and A. Strumia, Phys. Lett. B 433, 63 (1998) [hep-ph/9801353].
[12] L. Giusti, A. Romanino and A. Strumia, Nucl. Phys. B 550, 3 (1999) [hep-
ph/9811386].
[13] J. A. Casas, J. R. Espinosa and I. Hidalgo, “Implications for new physics from
fine-tuning arguments. I: Application to SUSY and seesaw cases”, JHEP 0411, 057
(2004) [arXiv:hep-ph/0410298].
[14] R. Trotta, “Bayes in the sky: Bayesian inference and model selection in cosmology”,
Contemp. Phys. 49, 71 (2008) [arXiv:0803.4089 [astro-ph]].
[15] G. D’Agostini, “Bayesian reasoning in data analysis: A critical introduction”, New
Jersey, USA: World Scientific (2003).
[16] H. Jeffreys, “Theory of probability, 3rd edn” , Oxford Classics series (reprinted
1998) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1961).
[17] E.L. Lehmann, G. Casella, “Theory of point estimation”, Springer texts in statistics,
1998, Springer.
[18] J.O. Berger, J.M. Bernardo and D. Sun , “The formal definition of reference priors”,
Annals of Statistics 2009, Vol. 37, No. 2, 905-938, [arXiv:0904.0156 [math.ST]].
26
[19] J. Press, “Subjective and Objective Bayesian Statistics: Principles, Models, and
Applications, 2nd Edition”, Wiley series in Probability and Statistics
[20] E.T. Jaynes, “Prior probabilities”, IEEE Transactions On Systems Science and
Cybernetics, vol. sec-4, no. 3, 1968, pp. 227-241
[21] C. Balazs, A. Buckley, D. Carter, B. Farmer and M. White, arXiv:1205.1568 [hep-
ph].
[22] S. Chatrchyan et al. [CMS Collaboration], Phys. Lett. B 716, 30 (2012)
[arXiv:1207.7235 [hep-ex]].
[23] G. Aad et al. [ATLAS Collaboration], Phys. Lett. B 716, 1 (2012) [arXiv:1207.7214
[hep-ex]].
[24] M. S. Chanowitz, M. A. Furman and I. Hinchliffe, “Weak Interactions Of Ultraheavy
Fermions”, Phys. Lett. B 78, 285 (1978).
[25] S. P. Martin, “A Supersymmetry Primer”, arXiv:hep-ph/9709356.
[26] Atlas Experiment, Public Results, https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/AtlasPublic.
[27] CMS Experiment, Public Results, https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/CMSPublic/PhysicsResults.
[28] B. C. Allanach, K. Cranmer, C. G. Lester and A. M. Weber, JHEP 0708, 023
(2007) [arXiv:0705.0487 [hep-ph]].
[29] E. Komatsu et al. [WMAP Collaboration], “Seven-Year Wilkinson Microwave
Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) Observations: Cosmological Interpretation”, Astro-
phys. J. Suppl. 192, 18 (2011) [arXiv:1001.4538 [astro-ph.CO]].
[30] E. A. Baltz, M. Battaglia, M. E. Peskin and T. Wizansky, “Determination of dark
matter properties at high-energy colliders”, Phys. Rev. D 74, 103521 (2006) [hep-
ph/0602187].
[31] B. C. Allanach, “SOFTSUSY: a program for calculating supersymmetric spectra”,
Comput. Phys. Commun. 143, 305 (2002) [arXiv:hep-ph/0104145].
[32] G. Belanger, F. Boudjema, A. Pukhov and A. Semenov, “MicrOMEGAs: Version
1.3”, Comput. Phys. Commun. 174, 577 (2006) [hep-ph/0405253]. G. Belanger,
F. Boudjema, A. Pukhov and A. Semenov, “MicrOMEGAs: A Program for calcu-
lating the relic density in the MSSM”, Comput. Phys. Commun. 149, 103 (2002)
[hep-ph/0112278].
[33] J. L. Feng, K. T. Matchev and T. Moroi, “Multi - TeV scalars are natural in mini-
mal supergravity”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 2322 (2000) [hep-ph/9908309]. J. L. Feng,
K. T. Matchev and F. Wilczek, “Neutralino dark matter in focus point supersym-
metry”, Phys. Lett. B 482, 388 (2000) [hep-ph/0004043].
[34] J. R. Ellis, S. F. King and J. P. Roberts, “The Fine-Tuning Price of Neutralino
Dark Matter in Models with Non-Universal Higgs Masses”, JHEP 0804, 099 (2008)
[arXiv:0711.2741 [hep-ph]].
[35] J. E. Kim and G. Carosi, “Axions and the Strong CP Problem”, Rev. Mod. Phys.
82, 557 (2010) [arXiv:0807.3125 [hep-ph]].
[36] K. Nakamura et al. (Particle Data Group), J. Phys. G 37, 075021 (2010)
27
[37] R. Bousso, “TASI Lectures on the Cosmological Constant”, Gen. Rel. Grav. 40, 607
(2008) [arXiv:0708.4231 [hep-th]]. J. Polchinski, “The cosmological constant and the
string landscape”, arXiv:hep-th/0603249.
[38] D. Baumann, “TASI Lectures on Inflation”, arXiv:0907.5424 [hep-th].
[39] N. Arkani-Hamed, L. J. Hall, C. F. Kolda and H. Murayama, “A New Perspective
on Cosmic Coincidence Problems”, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4434 (2000), [arXiv:astro-
ph/0005111].
28
